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Humankind has witnessed phenomenal economic and social development in the past century. However, there 
are increasing signs that it has come at a cost to the environment and to the availability of cheap resources. 
Despite progress, there is still great disparity between the rich and the poor.
 
The dilemma of expanding economic activities equitably while attempting to stabilize the rate of resource 
use and reduce environmental impacts poses an unprecedented opportunity and challenge to society. In this 
report, the International Resource Panel has sought to apply the concept of decoupling economic growth and 
human well-being from environmental impacts and resource use to address this challenge.
 
The report provides a solid foundation for the concept of decoupling, clearly defining key terms and providing 
empirical evidence of escalating resource use. It shows that decoupling is already taking place to some 
extent, but is lagging far behind its potential. The scenarios show that we are facing a historic choice about 
how we use resources and the report scopes the potential of innovation, rethinking economic growth and the 
role of cities in building more resource efficient economies. Four case studies at the country level show how 
policy makers are implementing decoupling strategies.
 
This report focuses on material resources, namely fossil fuels, minerals, metals and biomass and will be 
complemented by parallel reports of the IRP on land and soil, water, metals, cities and technologies to 
mitigate GHG emissions. These future reports will contribute to the International Resource Panel’s objective 
to build a better understanding of how to decouple environmental impacts from economic growth and 
improved human well-being.
 
It is hoped that policy makers aiming to green their economies will greatly benefit from the contributions 
that the International Resource Panel is making through its work on decoupling resource consumption from 
economic growth.
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ecoupling human well-being from 
resource consumption is at the 
heart of the International 
Resource Panel’s (IRP) mandate. It 
is also at the heart of the Green Economy 
Initiative of UNEP that has just produced an 
impressive report on the Green Economy 
(February 2011). 
The conceptual framework for decoupling 
and understanding of the instrumentalities 
for achieving it are still in an infant stage. 
The IRP plans to carry out a series of 
investigations on decoupling, each of which 
will result in a report. The reports will aim to 
support the Green Economy Initiative and 
also to stimulate appropriate policies and 
action at global, national and local levels. 
This first report is simply an attempt to 
scope the challenges. The report presents 
basic facts and figures on natural resource 
flows worldwide. Four country studies 
embedded in the report show that 
consumption of natural resources is still 
rising rapidly. Drawing on these data, the 
report attempts to outline the issues that 
now need to be addressed to decouple 
these material and energy flows from 
social and economic progress. 
Even in the two countries which arguably 
have made the most explicit efforts towards 
decoupling, Japan and Germany, and where 
at first glance domestic resource 
consumption shows stabilization or even a 
modest decline, deeper analysis shows that 
many goods contain parts that have been 
produced abroad using major amounts of 
energy, water and minerals. Thus some of 
the advanced countries are managing the 
problem of high resource intensity by 
“exporting” it elsewhere. The Report 
observes that trade – not surprisingly – is 
generally enhancing energy use and 
resource flows and thus, overall, impeding 
rather than promoting decoupling.
Two case studies from developing 
countries, China, and South Africa, show a 
steady increase of resource flows, probably 
indicative of the trends in all emerging 
economies. However, in the case of China 
there appears to be some success in the 
national effort to achieve relative 
decoupling through modernization of the 
economy and explicit policies to reduce 
resource intensity. Absolute reduction of 
energy and resource consumption cannot 
yet be expected to be part of the policies of 
developing countries. 
On a worldwide scale, resource 
consumption is steeply on the rise (see 
Figure 1), and resource consumption is still 
a reliable companion of economic 
prosperity (see Figure 8). All such empirical 
facts and figures show that the world’s 
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climate and geological environment are 
subject to ever increasing pressures, which 
are pushing the limits of sustainability. This 
should make citizens and policymakers 
impatient to reverse the dangerous trends 
and improve the situation. 
The report’s Introduction lists some of the 
challenges that will be addressed in future 
reports of the IRP. Among the positive 
prospects are technologies that deliver 
more and better services using much less 
energy, water, or minerals; policies and 
appropriate market signals that make the 
transition to a clean and low resource 
intensity economy attractive and profitable; 
and the special role of urban areas in 
forging innovations towards a sustainable 
economy. Such opportunities for effective 
decoupling offer not only lifelines for the 
survival of human civilization but also serve 
as preconditions for reducing poverty and 
social inequalities. 
New reports in the decoupling agenda 
pipeline include ones on technologies and 
policies, and on how cities can accelerate 
or be impacted by decoupling interventions. 
We hope that the growing interest in Green 
Economy issues, particularly among policy-
makers, will be well served by this work.
We are very grateful to the team 
coordinated by professors Marina Fischer-
Kowalski and Mark Swilling for having 
collected the relevant data and presenting 
a rounded picture of resource intensities 
and the attempts to reduce them. We thank 
the authors of the four case studies on 
national decoupling policies, which give 
strong inputs and support to the 
conclusions of the report. We hope that 
other such case studies will be triggered by 
the publication and circulation of this 
report, particularly by national institutions.
We also wish to thank Jeff McNeely, 
member of the IRP, for serving as Peer 
Review Coordinator for the report, and the 
(anonymous) peer reviewers who have 
gone to the trouble of reading and 
commenting the draft report; their 
suggestions have certainly improved its 
quality. Finally, we would like to thank the 
Paris Office of UNEP, notably Ms. Janet 
Salem, for excellent support work 
throughout the preparation of the report.
Dr. Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker
Emmendingen, Germany
Dr. Ashok Khosla
New Delhi, India
Co-Chairs, International Resource Panel (IRP)
31 March 2011
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A transition to a low carbon resource efficient Green Economy has become one of the leitmotifs of international efforts to evolve 
sustainable development in a rapidly 
changing 21st century.
Next year in Brazil, governments will meet 
again 20 years after the Rio Earth Summit 
of 1992 amid a landscape of persistent and 
emerging challenges and against a 
backdrop of recent and on-going crises 
that in part are being triggered by the way 
society manages or more precisely 
mismanages natural resources.
A Green Economy, in the context of 
sustainable development and poverty 
eradication, is one of the two central 
themes of Rio+20. It underlines that it is in 
the interests of all nations – developed and 
developing and state or market-led – to 
begin reducing humanity’s planetary 
impact in ways that reflect national 
circumstances.
This new report by UNEP’s International 
Resource Panel is an important part of 
this overall discourse and direction. It 
brings empirical evidence to bear on the 
levels of natural resources being 
consumed by humanity and the likely 
consumption levels if past trends are 
mirrored into the future.
Indeed it suggests that such unsustainable 
levels of consumption could triple resource 
use by 2050 and it brings forward the 
powerful and urgent concept of 
‘decoupling’ as a key action in order to 
catalyze a dramatically different path.
 
Decoupling at its simplest is reducing the 
amount of resources such as water or 
fossil fuels used to produce economic 
growth and delinking economic 
development from environmental 
deterioration. For it is clear in a world of 
nearly seven billion people, climbing to 
around nine billion in 40 years time that 
growth is needed to lift people out of 
poverty and to generate employment for 
the soon to be two billion people either 
unemployed or underemployed.
But this must be growth that prizes far 
more efficient resource management over 
mining the very assets that underpin 
livelihoods and our economic opportunities 
in the first place.
Overall the analysis suggests that over the 
coming decades the level of resources 
used by each and every person each year 
may need to fall to between five and six 
tons. Some developing countries are still 
below this level whereas others, such as 
India are now on average at 4 tons per 
capita and in some developed economies, 
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Canada for example, the figure is around 
25 tons.
The report points out that technological 
and systematic innovation, combined with 
rapid urbanization, offer an historic 
opportunity to turn the decoupling from 
theory into reality on the ground. The 
report spotlights the countries of China, 
German, Japan and South Africa where 
governments are making headway with 
conscious efforts to stimulate decoupling.
It underlines too how the complexities of the 
modern world, with globalized trade and 
exporting economies demand the kind of 
sophisticated analysis provided by the Panel 
if decoupling is to be fully understood and 
– more importantly – realized.
The sharp spikes in commodity prices have 
served to remind the international 
community of the risks we all run if a 
transition to a Green Economy is unfulfilled 
and postponed into an indefinite future. The 
evidence from preparations on the road to 
Rio+20 is that governments, the private 
sector and civil society realize this and are 
looking for the options that can scale-up 
and accelerate such a transition. 
Decoupling represents a strategic approach 
for moving forward a global Green Economy 
– one that “results in improved human 
well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks 
and ecological scarcities”. 
I would like to thank the International 
Resource Panel under the leadership of 
Ashok Khosla and Ernst Ulrich von 
Weizsäcker as co-chairs for its pioneering 
work presented in this report. It not only 
inspires current generations but also 
protects the interest of future ones.
Achim Steiner
UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Director, UNEP
Nairobi, Kenya, March 2011
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About the International 
Resource Panel
The International Resource Panel (IRP) was 
established to provide decision makers and 
other interested parties with independent 
and authoritative policy-relevant scientific 
assessments on the sustainable use of 
natural resources and, in particular, on 
their environmental impacts over their full 
life cycles. It aims to contribute to a better 
understanding of how to decouple 
economic growth from environmental 
degradation. This report on decoupling is 
part of the first series of reports of the IRP, 
covering amongst others biofuels, metal 
stocks in society and environmental 
impacts of consumption and production.
Objective and scope of the 
report
The objective of this study is to provide a 
solid foundation for the concept of 
decoupling, clearly defining key terms and 
concepts and indicating its many 
applications to resource management. It 
assesses whether decoupling is already 
taking place, and identifies the driving 
factors, both technological and economic. 
This report aims to also provide some 
indications of the kinds of policy measures 
and considerations that may be needed to 
stimulate decoupling. The word ‘Resources’ 
usually refers to materials, water, energy 
and land. This report focuses on material 
resources, namely fossil fuels, minerals, 
metals and biomass. As such, it is not the 
intention of the IRP to cover all resources 
and issues in a single report. Rather, this 
report will be complemented by parallel 
reports of the IRP on land and soil, water, 
metals, cities and technologies to mitigate 
GHG emissions. 
There are many gaps to be filled, and as 
the concept of decoupling is further 
developed, the IRP expects to identify other 
specific topics that warrant further 
assessment. It is hoped that sustainable 
development and new approaches to ‘green 
economics’ will greatly benefit from the 
contributions that the IRP will be making 
through its work on decoupling resource 
consumption from economic growth.
Objective and scope 
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Key findings
T
he 20th century was a time of 
remarkable progress for human 
civilization. Driven by technological 
advances as well as demographic 
and economic growth, the annual 
extraction of construction materials grew 
by a factor of 34, ores and minerals by a 
factor of 27, fossil fuels by a factor of 12, 
biomass by a factor of 3.6, and total 
material extraction by a factor of about 
eight, while GDP rose 23-fold (Figure 1). 
This expansion of material consumption 
was not equitably distributed and it had 
profound environmental impacts.
As earlier reports of the International 
Resource Panel (IRP) have concluded, 
overexploitation of resources, climate 
change, pollution, land-use change, and 
loss of biodiversity rose toward the top of 
Figure 1. Global material extraction in billion tons, 1900–2005
Source: Krausmann et al., 2009
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the list of major international 
environmental concerns. One result is that 
‘sustainability’ has become an overarching 
social and economic imperative among 
governments, international organizations, 
and businesses. Leaders in these sectors 
now understand that making progress 
towards a more sustainable economy 
requires an absolute reduction in resource 
use at a global level, while human well-
being demands that economic activities 
should expand and environmental impacts 
diminish.
The dilemma of expanding economic 
activities while reducing the rate of 
resource use and reducing the 
environmental impact of any such use 
poses a serious challenge to society.
In this paper, the International Resource 
Panel has sought to apply the concept of 
‘decoupling’ to this challenge. While the 
term has been applied to everything from 
electronics to physical cosmology to linear 
algebra, in the sense used here decoupling 
means using less resources per unit of 
economic output and reducing the 
environmental impact of any resources that 
are used or economic activities that are 
undertaken. Figure 2 captures the essence 
of the two key aspects of decoupling as 
Figure 2. Two aspects of ‘decoupling’
Human well-being
Economic activity (GDP)
Resource use
Environmental impact
Resource decoupling
Impact decoupling
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applied to sustainable development, 
namely resource decoupling and impact 
decoupling.
 
The IRP report on ‘Priority Products and 
Materials’ clarified how different economic 
activities influence the use of natural 
resources and the generation of wastes (an 
important negative environmental impact). 
This report focuses on the extraction of the 
four categories of primary raw materials 
depicted in Figure 1 – construction 
minerals, ores and industrial minerals, 
fossil fuels, and biomass – which together 
are estimated to be harvested at a rate of 
47 to 59 billion metric tons (47–59 Gt) per 
year globally (2005 data), with a clear 
tendency toward continued increases into 
the future. 
The steady increase in the use of these raw 
materials has been accompanied, or 
perhaps prompted, by continuously 
declining prices of most of these 
categories of resources. On the other hand, 
many critical resources are becoming more 
expensive to extract, with petroleum in the 
Arctic and in the open sea being 
outstanding examples. At least some of 
these resources are now showing greater 
price volatility, which may support a more 
rapid transition toward decoupling. 
Decoupling will require significant 
changes in government policies, corporate 
behaviour and consumption patterns by 
the public. These changes will not be 
easy, and this report will not attempt to 
chart the course toward their achievement 
or fully explore all of the challenges the 
concept poses. Rather, it will seek to build 
understanding of the concept of 
decoupling and clarify the most important 
decoupling challenges that the IRP should 
be addressing in its assessments in the 
coming years. Technology and policy 
options to facilitate decoupling will be 
assessed in a separate IRP report.
Drawing especially on case studies from 
South Africa, Germany, China and Japan, 
this report explores some of the ways in 
which decoupling relates to development. 
The rising economic costs of resource 
depletion and negative environmental 
impacts have led these countries to adopt 
policies that commit both governments and 
industries to reduce the amount of 
resources used for each unit of production 
(in other words, increase resource 
decoupling) and reduce negative impacts 
on the environment (in other words, 
implement impact decoupling). 
9
While the future is unpredictable, it is 
useful to contemplate the implications of 
policy choices, of which three scenarios 
are considered here: 
1. business as usual and 
convergence, where industrialized 
countries maintain their per capita 
resource consumption, and 
developing countries increase their 
consumption rates to the same 
level as industrialized countries. 
This would lead to a tripling of 
global annual resource extraction 
by 2050; 
2. moderate contraction and 
convergence, where industrialized 
countries halve their per capita 
resource consumption, and 
developing countries increase their 
consumption rates to the same 
level as industrialized countries. 
This would lead to a 40% increase 
in global annual resource extraction 
by 2050;
3. tough contraction and 
convergence, where total global 
resource consumption is 
maintained at the year 2000 level, 
and the per capita resource 
consumption is the same in all 
countries. This by definition would 
keep global resource extraction at 
its current levels. 
None of these scenarios will lead to actual 
reductions in global annual resource 
extraction, but all indicate that substantial 
reductions in the resource requirements of 
economic activities will be necessary if the 
growing world population hopes to live 
under conditions of sustainable resource 
management. Innovations will be essential, 
perhaps even leading to a progress indicator 
that complements GDP with environmental 
and social concerns. UNEP’s Green 
Economy Initiative, for example, seeks to 
couple a revived world economy with 
reducing ecosystem degradation, water 
scarcity, and carbon dependence. Other 
innovations that can support decoupling will 
be discussed in more detail in future reports 
of the IRP Decoupling Working Group. 
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Decoupling is highly relevant to trade and 
the distribution of resources. Many 
resources follow a complex path from the 
beginning to the end of their life cycle, 
involving many actors along the way 
(Figure 3), so allocating responsibility for 
consumption (and therefore decoupling) 
along this value chain remains a challenge. 
Internationally traded materials increased 
from 5.4 billion tons (5.4 Gt) in 1970 to 
19 billion tons (19 Gt) in 2005, complicating 
the application of decoupling by obscuring 
responsibility for it.
Decoupling potentially can also enhance 
equity among nations, drawing on the 
concept of ‘metabolic rates’ (resources 
used per capita) as an objective means of 
comparing resource consumption rates of 
different countries. Overcoming inequity 
needs particular attention. In some 
countries, metabolic rates are as low as 
four tons/capita/year, indicating a lack of 
satisfaction of basic needs. In other 
countries, metabolic rates amount to 
40 tons/capita/year and more, indicating a 
demand upon the planet’s resources that 
cannot be extended to all its inhabitants, let 
alone future generations.
This paper presents substantial evidence 
supporting the need for both resource 
decoupling and impact decoupling, and 
provides some examples of where such 
decoupling is actually occurring. While 
different categories of resources have very 
different kinds of environmental impacts, 
progress toward decoupling has been made 
in all four of the categories of resources 
being considered here. But this progress to 
date has been indicative rather than 
decisive, and a far greater effort will be 
required to convince key audiences of the 
critical importance of decoupling. The future 
work of the International Resource Panel is 
designed to support such efforts, in the 
hope that they will lead to a ‘green economy’ 
that enhances human welfare while 
sustaining environmental resources.
11
1.1 Why decoupling?
Human well-being and its improvement, 
now and for a larger world population in 
the future, is based upon the availability of 
natural resources such as energy, 
materials, water and land. Demographic 
and economic development have led to a 
rapid rise in the use of these resources. 
Many of them are becoming less abundant 
relative to demand, and some run the risk 
of critical scarcity in the near future (as 
indicated by declining grades of ores being 
mined for example). Resource use links 
economic activities to the environment, so 
this report uses an economic definition of 
‘material resources’: natural assets 
deliberately extracted and modified by 
human activity for their utility to create 
economic value. These assets can be 
measured both in physical units (such as 
tons, joules or area), and in monetary 
terms expressing their economic value. 
Such a focus enables this report to apply 
accounting measures to the four categories 
of material resources it is assessing, at 
several levels where data on population 
and economic activity (GDP) are available. 
Undesirable environmental impacts can 
arise from any part of the life cycle of 
resource use: in the phases of extraction, 
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production/manufacture, consumption/use, 
or post-consumption disposal (Figure 3). 
These impacts may be caused by deliberate 
interventions into natural systems such as 
land-cover change and resource extraction, 
or by unintended side effects, such as 
emissions and wastes. These impacts may 
lead to disruptions of at least some of the 
ecosystem services that are essential to 
human well-being. Thus a focus on 
decoupling requires attention both to the 
amount of resource use linked with 
economic activity, and to the environmental 
impacts associated with this resource use 
at all stages of the life cycle. 
 
Reducing both resource use and 
environmental impacts means reducing the 
material losses at each stage in the life 
cycle – losses that result from converting 
energy carriers into CO2 (and other) 
emissions, and other material resources 
into wastes, in the process of generating 
economic services and value. Decoupling is 
about generating economic services and 
value with declining amounts of resources, 
declining wastes and emissions, and 
declining other environmental impacts.
This report will indicate how meeting the 
challenges of decoupling resource use and 
negative environmental impacts from 
economic activity can contribute to the 
overall goals of meeting the needs of a 
growing world population, eradicating 
poverty, and supporting economic 
development, with a minimum of strain on 
the world’s resource base and without 
threatening future ecosystem services. 
The report seeks to establish a qualitative 
and quantitative foundation upon which 
Figure 3. The life cycle of resource extraction and use
➥ Recycling flows
➥ Emissions (mainly CO2)
● Flows of energy carriers (biomass and fossil fuels)
● Other material flows (ores, construction minerals)
Infrastructure
Waste 
disposal
Consumption 
and use
Distribution
Production
Resource 
extraction
Environment
Socio-economic system
Note: flows of resources, emissions and wastes according to European 
proportions
Source: Fischer-Kowalski, 2011
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strategies of decoupling can be built. For 
the assessment of resource uses and their 
environmental impacts, it will use a global 
and long-term perspective. However, while 
the challenges of resource depletion and 
environmental disruption are global 
challenges, they affect people differently in 
different localities. Extraction of a resource, 
its conversion into a commodity, its 
ultimate consumption, and its disposal or 
recycling, often occur in different countries, 
and the benefits as well as the 
environmental impacts associated with 
each stage in the life cycle are widely 
distributed across time and space. 
1.2 Defining decoupling
‘Decoupling’ applied to natural resources 
has grown out of the concept of ‘eco-
efficiency’ developed by the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) in 1992, and the 2001 OECD 
definition of decoupling as breaking the 
link between ‘environmental bads’ and 
‘economic goods’. From a developing world 
context, the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
in 2004 promoted the idea of ‘non-material 
economic growth’, essentially decoupling 
economic growth from resource 
consumption. 
Building on such foundations, resource 
decoupling means reducing the rate of 
resource use per unit of economic activity. 
This ‘dematerialization’ is based on using 
less material, energy, water and land 
resources for the same economic output. 
Resource decoupling leads to an increase 
in the efficiency with which resources are 
used, indicated when economic output 
(GDP) is increasing relative to resource 
input, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Resource decoupling can alleviate the 
problems of scarcity and intergenerational 
equity by reducing the rate of resource 
depletion, while reducing costs by raising 
resource productivity. On the other hand, 
productivity increases may result in 
accelerated economic growth that 
generates more use of resources rather 
than resource savings, a phenomenon 
known as the ‘rebound effect’. Indeed, 
some economists argue that the availability 
of energy resources to be used is an 
indispensable driver of economic growth, 
thereby questioning whether resource 
decoupling is feasible. Evidence presented 
here indicates that some resource 
decoupling has in fact characterized the 
20th century (Figures 1 and 4). 
Impact decoupling, by contrast, requires 
increasing economic output while reducing de
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negative environmental impacts. Such 
impacts arise from the extraction of 
resources (such as groundwater pollution 
due to mining or agriculture), production 
(such as land degradation, wastes and 
emissions), the use phase of commodities 
(for example fuel combustion in transport 
resulting in CO2 emissions), and in the 
post-consumption phase (again wastes and 
emissions). Impacts are decoupled when 
negative environmental impacts decline 
while value is added in economic terms. 
Impact decoupling means using resources 
better, wiser or more cleanly. Reducing 
environmental impacts does not 
necessarily reduce resource scarcity or 
production costs, and may even increase 
them. An example of this is carbon capture 
and storage (CCS); since this impact 
decoupling technology currently requires 
more energy per unit of output, resource 
decoupling does not take place, but since 
CO2 is no longer released into the 
atmosphere, the environmental impact 
over the life cycle is reduced.
A distinction must be drawn between 
decoupling and absolute resource use 
reductions. Decoupling of resources or 
impacts means that the growth rate of the 
environmentally relevant parameter 
(resources used or some measure of 
environmental impact) is lower than the 
growth rate of a relevant economic 
indicator (for example GDP). Such 
decoupling seems to be fairly common, but 
does not necessarily lead to absolute 
reductions in resource use. Decoupling will 
lead to absolute reductions in resource 
use only when the growth rate of resource 
productivity exceeds the growth rate of the 
economy. This latter case is reflected in the 
‘environmental Kuznets curve’, where the 
environmental impact of production and 
consumption decreases as prosperity rises 
beyond a certain point.
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D
ecoupling economic activity from 
undesirable environmental impacts 
requires an improved 
understanding of resource-use 
trends and their drivers. One approach to 
measuring resource use is ‘material flow 
accounting’ (MFA), which quantifies all 
materials used in economic activities. MFA 
accounts for the total material mobilized 
during the extraction process (i.e. the ‘total 
material requirement’) and for the materials 
actually used in economic processes (‘direct 
material consumption’), measured in terms 
of their mass (metric tons). For reasons of 
data reliability and clarity, this report 
focuses on materials actually used in 
economic processes. As a rule of thumb, 
total material requirement is about twice as 
much as direct material consumption. The 
MFA methodology generates accounts in 
physical terms that are analogous to GDP 
and use the same system boundaries, so it 
yields data that support an analysis of 
decoupling of material resource use from 
economic activity. 
Negative environmental impacts are 
undesirable changes in the natural 
environment that can be causally linked to 
some socio-economic activity. 
Environmental impacts are usually 
assessed on the product level by life cycle 
2. Global long-term trends in the use  
of natural resources and associated 
undesirable environmental impacts© L
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assessments (LCA) that refer to seven (or 
more) impact categories supported by 
statistical data: acidification; climate 
change and global warming; eco-toxicity; 
human toxicity; eutrophication/nutrient 
enrichment; photochemical ozone 
formation (summer smog); and 
stratospheric ozone depletion. 
2.1	 The	global	dynamics	of	
material	resource	use
The global	use of material resources 
equals the annual amount of raw materials 
extracted. On the level of individual	
countries, the amount of materials 
extracted domestically (termed DE, 
‘domestic extraction’) is not equivalent to 
materials use, as national material use 
(termed DMC, ‘domestic material 
consumption’) also depends upon imports 
and exports. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, 
estimates for the quantity of global raw 
materials extraction ranged between 47 and 
59 billion metric tons (47–59 Gt) per year. 
Global annual material extraction increased 
over the 20th century by a factor of eight. For 
much of that century, biomass dominated 
material extraction and use, accounting for 
almost three quarters of the total in 1900. A 
century later, more biomass resources were 
being harvested, but the percent 
contribution to total material extraction had 
declined to only one third, because the 
global socio-economic metabolism 
increasingly turned towards mineral 
resources, including fossil fuels which 
replaced biomass used for combustion. In 
other words, the composition of materials 
used has shifted from renewable to non-
renewable resources.
A major driver of the overall increase in 
raw material extraction and use is the 
expanding human population. Each 
country’s material use (domestic material 
consumption, DMC) is coupled to the 
number of inhabitants. This is plainly 
evident for food, for example, but it also 
holds for other material resources that 
have become part of the national material 
standard of living. Thus the metabolic rate 
(resource use per capita) provides a fairly 
robust overall measure of consumption. 
Metabolic rates vary widely among 
countries and change with development 
and economic patterns. For example, one 
person more in India means on average an 
additional 4 tons of resource use, while one 
person more in Canada means on average 
25 tons more resource use. 
While global per capita income has 
increased sevenfold during the course of 
the 20th century, average resource use per 
17
capita merely doubled (Figure 4). A global 
inhabitant in 2005 required somewhere 
between 8.5 and 9.2 tons of resources 
annually, while a hundred years earlier the 
average global metabolic rate per capita 
was just 4.6 tons. These findings indicate 
substantial per capita decoupling of 
resource use from economic development.
Average global metabolic rates have 
sometimes grown slowly (such as the 
period from 1900 to the end of World War 
II), and sometimes rapidly (such as the 
period from the end of World War II up to 
the global oil crisis in the early 1970s). 
From the 1973 oil shock until the turn of 
the century, the global average has again 
remained fairly stable and continued to do 
so in the industrialized countries (Figure 5). 
Apparently, this oil crisis mattered not only 
economically (because price levels soon 
Figure 4. Global metabolic rates 1900–2005, and income
Source: Krausmann et al., 2009; based on Sec Database "Growth in global materials use, GDP and population during the 20th century", Version 1.0 
(June 2009): http://uni-klu.ac.at/socec/inhalt/3133.htm)
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recovered, see Figures 6 and 7), but it also 
changed the pattern of relations between 
material use and income in industrial 
countries. Globally, though, in recent years 
metabolic rates have started to rise again, 
driven by rapidly growing resource use in 
large emerging economies such as Brazil, 
China and India which now display a 
pattern similar to that of the industrial 
countries in the 1950s and 1960s.
These data indicate that global material 
resource use during the 20th century has 
been rising at about twice the rate of 
population growth, but still at a 
substantially lower pace than the world 
economy. This resource decoupling has 
taken place ‘spontaneously’ rather than as 
a result of policy intention and even though 
resource prices declined by about 30% in 
the course of the 20th century (Figure 6). It 
Figure 5. Gross Domestic Production and Domestic Material Consumption in OECD countries,
1980–2000 
Indexed 
1980=100
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Source: OECD, 2008b. Data update provided by OECD on 1 April 2011, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/12/40464014.pdf
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is noteworthy, however, that resource 
prices declined by about 30% during the 
course of the 20th century as a result of 
accelerated discovery, technological 
advances, rising investment levels and 
global trading arrangements that 
increased global competition (Figure 6).
A similar phenomenon may now be 
happening in conjunction with the current 
economic crisis (Figure 7). A steep rise in 
raw material prices reached a maximum in 
2007, and a return to usual price levels may 
have started in 2008. For the time being, 
though, it is hard to tell whether this return 
to price levels ‘as usual’ will lead to a 
further decline in prices, or a subsequent 
increase. If, however, the steady price rises 
since late 2009 continue, this may confirm 
that a combination of resource depletion 
and rising demand could bring the era of 
declining resource prices to an end. 
Although prices on their own will not result 
in decoupling, rising resource prices are a 
necessary but by no means sufficient 
condition for long-term decoupling.
In a cross-country comparison, the relation 
between income and resource use per 
capita is uniformly continuous: as a rule, 
the more income, the more resource use. 
But Figure 8 indicates that some countries 
can achieve high incomes per capita while 
consuming relatively few resources, while 
Figure 6. Composite resource price index (at 
constant prices, 1900–2000)
Source: Wagner et al., 2002
Indexed 
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Figure 7. Commodity price indices
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), historical 
price data, available from http://blogs.worldbank.org/prospects/global-
commodity-watch-march-2011
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Figure 8. The global interrelation between resource use and income (175 countries in the year 2000)
Source: Steinberger et al., 2010
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other countries have very high resource 
consumption levels per capita without a 
correspondingly high income. Two key 
factors account for much of the variation in 
the metabolic rates of countries: the 
transformation from agriculture-based to 
fossil fuel-based economies 
(‘development’), and population density. 
Industrial countries with high population 
density (among them many European 
countries and Japan) have an average 
metabolic rate of about 13 tons/capita, 
while those with low population density (for 
example Finland, the USA and Australia) 
have a metabolic rate twice as high, 
although income and material comfort do 
not substantially differ. Also among the not 
yet fully industrialized countries, those with 
high population density (such as China and 
India) showed average metabolic rates of 
5 tons/capita in the year 2000, while the 
metabolic rates in comparable low-density 
developing countries (e.g. Brazil and South 
Africa) were more than twice as high 
(Figure 9). It appears that densely 
populated areas and regions need fewer 
resources per capita for the same standard 
of living and material comfort. 
The decrease in need for materials with 
rising population density is essentially good 
news in a rapidly urbanizing world. The 
doubling of metabolic rates due to the 
traditional resource and energy-intensive 
industrial transformation, on the other 
hand, is a major challenge for those 
high-density countries: the resource and 
environmental burden of each of their 
inhabitants’ is about to double. This is also 
a challenge for the rest of the world in 
terms of resource depletion and 
environmental impact, especially as almost 
two thirds of the world population live in 
these high density countries with – so far 
– very low metabolic rates. 
It is necessary, therefore, to relate 
strategies dealing with resource use to 
Figure 9. Average metabolic rates (resource 
use in tons/capita) by development status and 
population density 
High-density means a population density of 50 people/km2 or higher. 
Share in world population: 13% industrial, high density, 6% industrial, 
low density, 62% rest of the world, high density, 6% rest of the world, 
low density. 
Source: Krausmann et al., 2008
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development strategies. While it seems 
fully justified to promote resource use 
reductions for industrialized countries, the 
low metabolic rates in developing 
countries often reflect a lack of 
satisfaction of basic needs and a low 
standard of material comfort. Social 
justice calls for environmental and 
economic space to address poverty 
through investment in the necessary 
material infrastructures.
However, the key issue is how these 
countries go about this. If they emulate 
the technologies and the industrial 
transformation of the past, their efforts 
will be undercut by the consequences of 
resource depletion and environmental 
impacts. Their optimal strategy, therefore, 
is to exploit the remaining space while 
simultaneously pursuing a less resource- 
and energy-intensive growth and 
development pathway. Resource and 
impact decoupling can help describe what 
such a less resource- and energy-
intensive pathway could look like and how 
it could be achieved. Indeed, for many 
rapidly industrializing countries 
decoupling may be a precondition for 
achieving the types of innovation-driven 
growth rates that will be necessary to 
generate the diversified economies, basic 
infrastructures and ecosystem services 
needed to eradicate poverty.
2.2 Assessing the dynamics 
of global environmental 
impacts 
UNEP’s International Resource Panel 
published a report in 2010 that used 
environmental assessment tools to assess 
the environmental impacts of global 
production and consumption activities over 
the life cycle, and established a link 
between different categories of materials 
and environmental impacts. For more 
information, please see www.unep.org. 
 
The report identified biomass as one of the 
most important drivers of environmental 
pressures, especially habitat change, climate 
change, water use and toxic emissions. The 
use of fossil fuels for heating, transportation, 
metal refining and the production of 
manufactured goods is of comparable 
importance, causing the depletion of fossil 
energy resources, climate change, and a 
wide range of emissions-related impacts.
The impacts related to these activities are 
unlikely to be reduced, but rather 
enhanced, in a business as usual scenario 
for the future. These dynamics are also 
important considerations when it comes to 
resource decoupling. 
Industrial minerals and ores are a very 
heterogeneous class of resources, de
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dominated quantitatively by ferrous metals 
and mineral fertilizers. The most 
accessible impact information is from the 
extraction phase in the life cycle of those 
resources, where impacts often involve 
disturbance to land, air and water systems. 
The location of resource extraction is 
relevant from an environmental impact 
point of view because environmental 
regulations vary in different parts of the 
world. Those standards tend to be tighter 
in wealthy industrial countries than in 
poorer developing countries. Extraction of 
industrial ores and minerals has doubled in 
the past 25 years and shifted from 
industrial towards developing and newly-
industrializing countries (NIC); in 2006, 
more than half of all minerals and ores 
were extracted outside of industrial 
countries.
Fossil fuels are closely associated with CO2 
emissions in the use phase, as well as 
local impacts in the extraction phase. Over 
the past 100 years or so, while GDP rose by 
a factor of 22, fossil fuel use rose by a 
factor of 14 (and GHG emissions by a factor 
of 13). The increasing use of coal for energy 
may even raise the volume of GHG 
emissions per unit of fossil fuel use. 
An additional concern for non-biotic 
materials is the decline of ore grades and 
oil production capacity, and the increasing 
expense, energy and other environmental 
factors it will take to extract them. 
The use of biomass is strongly related to 
impacts on global sulphur and nutrient 
cycles, with human induced flows now 
equalling natural flows. Some studies have 
shown that biomass extraction may be 
somewhat decoupling from land use, but 
coupled with increasing amounts of 
fertilizer use per unit of agricultural yield 
(see Figure 10).
● Nitrogenous fertilizer consumption
● Cereals production
● Cereals, area harvested
Indexed 
1961=100
Figure 10. Global growth of cereals production 
and fertilizer consumption   
Note: Global growth in the production of cereals since 1961 almost 
exclusively depended on intensification (nitrogen input, tractors, 
yields and many other factors not shown on this graph), whereas the 
expansion of harvested area played an insignificant role.
Source: UNEP GEO Portal, as compiled from FAOSTAT database, Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
http://geodata.grid.unep.ch 
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Strategies to reduce impacts
Most environmental policies have been 
directed at specific impacts, such as 
halting deforestation, keeping the 
stratospheric ozone layer intact, reducing 
toxic substances in the human food chain, 
preventing eutrophication of water bodies, 
or reducing air-polluting emissions 
detrimental to human health. In relation to 
economic activities, these policies met with 
variable levels of success and tended to 
impose additional costs (some might say 
they paid for their real costs). 
Undesirable environmental impacts can 
be reduced by three main strategies: 
(a) changing the mix of resources used 
through substitution of more harmful by 
less harmful resources; (b) using 
resources more environmentally carefully 
throughout their life cycle; and (c) 
reducing resource use. 
Strategy (a), substitution, is effective but 
has limits. As shown in this report, the use 
of all material resources is increasing 
substantially. Even on more detailed levels, 
it is hard to find any one material that is at 
present used less than a few decades ago. 
For example, the IRP reports on metals 
demonstrate a clear trend toward using 
increasing amounts of a greater variety of 
metals as resources, now including 
virtually all naturally-occurring metal 
elements. This expansion puts limits on 
(present or future) substitution. Further, 
the purposes for which material resources 
can be used are very different and limited 
by their physical and chemical properties. 
Strategy (b), using resources 
environmentally more carefully 
throughout their life cycle, has been and is 
a key strategy for environmental policies. 
Figure 11 illustrates the interdependence 
between the scale of environmental impact 
and increasing wealth: household-level 
Figure 11. Environmental risk transition 
framework
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environmental burdens (such as dirty water 
or indoor pollution) decline with a rise in 
wealth, community-level burdens (such as 
urban air pollution) display a hump-shaped 
curve, and global environmental burdens 
(such as greenhouse gas emissions) rise. 
Over time, global impacts on the 
environment may become more important 
than local ones, and delayed impacts are 
becoming more important than immediate 
ones (see green arrows at the bottom of 
Figure 11). Those global, delayed impacts 
(such as climate change) may be less 
accessible to traditional, life cycle-oriented 
environmental policies. Nevertheless, 
changes in key technologies (such as, for 
example, in the technology of producing 
cement) may make a big difference to the 
environmental impact of resource use, also 
at the global level.
Strategy (c), reducing resource use, is the 
most powerful, as it reduces all 
environmental impacts associated with a 
certain resource use, and it is the most 
economical, as it also reduces production 
costs in the long run. It cannot be achieved 
by environmental policies alone: to be 
effective, it requires concerted strategies 
from a variety of political actors and from 
business. This strategy becomes more 
important when resource extraction and 
use is approaching certain limits: the 
closer the limits, the higher the likely 
environmental impact per unit of resource 
use. This holds for biotic resources like fish 
catch or logging, it also holds for fossil 
fuels with ‘unconventional’ fuels 
representing a larger environmental 
burden, and it can also be assumed for 
industrial minerals and ores. 
Internationally, for most metals, ore grades 
are declining, and thus need a higher input 
of energy and an increasing volume of 
extraction for the same output.
In conclusion, it appears that short-term 
and local environmental impacts of 
resource use across the resource life cycle 
have been mitigated in a way that allows 
for impact decoupling beyond resource 
decoupling. With global and far-reaching 
environmental impacts, this is less likely to 
be the case. Different strategies to reduce 
these impacts are available for 
policymakers. The IRP’s second report on 
decoupling will focus on assessing the 
technology and policy options that can 
make decoupling happen.
2.3 Scenarios of future 
global materials use 
Can the growth in resource consumption 
and economic factors shown in Figures 1 
and 4 continue into the future? Or will 
societies face some limits to growth as 
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populations and their metabolic rates 
increase? Such questions are impossible to 
answer with much authority, but scenarios 
– plausible stories of how the future may 
develop, based on a coherent and internally 
consistent depiction of the key drivers of 
change – can help to provide insight into 
the policy challenges of the future. The 
three scenarios presented in the report 
underline the urgency of decoupling 
resource consumption and negative 
environmental impacts from economic 
development. 
The scenarios are for the year 2050, 
compared to a year 2000 baseline. They 
assume population growth according to 
UN projections (medium variant) and a 
continuation of the current patterns that 
densely populated regions and countries 
require only about half the metabolic rate 
for the same standard of living as sparsely 
populated areas. All scenarios also 
assume that developed industrialized 
countries and developing countries (some 
of which are already committed to rapid 
industrialization of their economies) will 
converge by 2050 to a point where all 
countries have roughly similar per capita 
levels of resource use. 
In two respects, the scenarios are not 
fully realistic: first, convergence trends at 
present cannot be observed for all 
countries. The implications of this are 
that the vision of ‘convergence by 2050’ 
(which expresses a normative 
commitment to socio-economic justice) 
is only one option. The ‘fortress world’ 
scenario as outlined in other reports, in 
which a large number of countries are 
excluded from access to resources, might 
be just as likely. Second, no impact of 
physical constraints is built into the 
scenarios. This is clearly unrealistic, but 
the scenarios seek to demonstrate the 
implications of ignoring resource 
constraints (as nearly all the mainstream 
growth and development models do). 
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Wherever the future global consumption 
of a resource comes close to supply 
constraints, the threat of distributional 
conflicts will arise, as indicated by the 
many resource-based conflicts that 
already exist in the world today. 
Scenario 1: Business as usual
Freeze (industrial countries) and catching 
up (rest of the world) 
In this scenario, relative decoupling in 
industrial countries means their average 
metabolic rates remain stable at year 2000 
levels (freeze), while developing countries 
build up to the same metabolic rate by 2050 
(catching up). For some of the least 
developed countries, convergence implies at 
least a fivefold increase in their metabolic 
rates, which may significantly reduce 
poverty in the process. This scenario 
complies well with trends observed in the 
recent decades; for industrialized countries, 
metabolic rates had remained fairly stable 
since the mid-1970s while in many 
developing countries a steep increase could 
be observed. In short, for this scenario the 
long-term trend is a continuation of relative 
decoupling for developed economies, and 
effectively no decoupling for emerging and 
developing economies.
This scenario results in a global metabolic 
scale of 140 billion tons annually by 2050, and 
an average global metabolic rate of 16 tons/
capita/year. In relation to the year 2000, this 
would imply more than a tripling of annual 
global resource extraction, and establish 
global metabolic rates that correspond to the 
present European average. 
This scenario assumes no major system 
innovation or switch to renewable energy, 
and probably represents an unsustainable 
future in terms of both resource use and 
emissions, exceeding all measures of 
available resources and assessments of 
limits to the capacity to absorb impacts. 
Scenario 2: Moderate contraction and 
convergence
Reduction by a factor of 2 (industrial 
countries) and catching up (rest of the 
world)
Industrial countries commit to an absolute 
reduction of resource use and reduce their 
metabolic rates by a factor of 2 (i.e. from an 
average of 16 tons/capita to 8 tons/capita), 
while developing countries moderately 
increase their metabolic rates and catch up 
to these reduced rates by the year 2050. 
This scenario presupposes substantial 
structural change, requiring a new pattern 
of industrial production and consumption 
that would be quite different from the 
traditional industrial model. With resource 
productivity gains similar to past 
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achievements, these metabolic rates could 
support a comfortable lifestyle for all in 
both developing and developed economies. 
For developing countries, this scenario 
implies relative decoupling to increase 
their metabolic rates by no more than a 
factor 1.2 to 1.3 (depending upon density) 
which, in turn, represents a substantial 
commitment to innovations for decoupling. 
This scenario amounts to a global metabolic 
rate of 70 billion tons by 2050, which means 
about 40% more annual resource extraction 
than in the year 2000. The average global 
metabolic rate would stay roughly the same 
as in 2000, at 8 tons/capita/year. 
Taken as a whole, this scenario would be 
achievable only with significant decoupling 
through investments in innovations that 
result in systems of production and 
consumption that generate far more per 
unit of resources than is currently the case. 
While overall constraints (e.g. food supply) 
will not be transgressed in a severe way 
beyond what they are now, developing 
countries in this scenario have the chance 
to achieve a rising share of global 
resources, and for some absolute increase 
in resource use, while industrial countries 
must cut their consumption. 
Scenario 3: Tough contraction and 
convergence
Freeze global resource consumption at 
the 2000 level, and converge (industrial & 
developing countries)
The level of global resource consumption in 
2050 is limited to the global resource 
consumption of the year 2000. Metabolic 
rates of industrial and developing countries 
converge at around 6 tons per capita per 
year. This scenario requires far-reaching 
absolute resource use reductions in the 
industrialized countries, by a factor of 3 to 5. 
Countries classified as ‘developing’ in the 
year 2000 would have to achieve 10–20% 
reductions in their average metabolic rates. 
This scenario amounts to a global 
metabolic scale of 50 billion tons by 2050 
(by definition the same as in the year 2000) 
and allows for an average global metabolic 
rate of 6 tons/capita/year.
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Taken as a whole, this scenario would 
require unprecedented levels of innovation. 
Despite population growth to roughly 
9 billion people the pressure on the 
environment would remain roughly the 
same as it is now. Most politicians are 
likely to regard this scenario as too 
restrictive in terms of developmental goals 
such as reducing poverty and providing for 
the material comfort of a rapidly expanding 
middle class. Thus this scenario can hardly 
be addressed as a possible strategic goal, 
but is valuable insofar as it illuminates the 
implications of a hypothetical barrier to 
further global increase of resource 
extraction. It should, however, be noted 
that this scenario is consistent with the 
2.2 tons of carbon per capita recommended 
by the IPCC as the convergence point that 
could prevent warming by more than 
2 degrees centigrade.
The implications of these scenarios are 
far reaching. All demonstrate that 
without significant improvements in 
resource productivity, it will not be 
possible to meet the needs of 9 billion 
people by 2050. The policy implications 
Figure 12. Resource use according to three different scenarios up to 2050
Source: Krausmann et al., 2009 (Development 1900–2005) and own calculations (see text)
● Development 1900–2005
● Freeze and catching up
● Factor 2 and catching up
● Freeze global material consumption
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are clear: as the economic consequences 
of resource scarcities and degraded 
environments start to work their way 
through the world economy, policymaking 
will start to take more and more seriously 
the implications of scientific research 
about decoupling. However, even if it 
were possible to build a global political 
consensus on the need for absolute 
resource use reductions in developed 
economies and relative decoupling in 
developing countries, change will only be 
able to go as fast as the levels of 
investment in innovations for decoupling 
across the entire value chain. 
The bottom line is that threats to 
consumption need not be equated to 
threats to well-being and reasonably 
comfortable lifestyles, but rather as threats 
to particular kinds of resource-intensive 
modes of consumption.
Baseline
Scenario 1:
Business as 
usual
Scenario 2:
Moderate 
contraction and 
convergence
Scenario 3: 
Tough 
contraction and 
convergence
Year 2000 2050 2050 2050
World population
(Billions)
6.0 8.9 8.9 8.9
World Metabolic rate
(Tons/capita/year)
8 16 8 5.5 
World Metabolic scale
(Billion tons/year)
49 141 70 49 
Metabolic rate Industrialized 
High density
13 13 6.5 5
Industrialized 
Low density
24 24 12 8
Developing
High density
5 13 6.5 5
Developing
Low density
9 24 12 8
Table 1. Metabolic scales and rates, overview of scenario analysis
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3.1 Rethinking growth
The logic of decoupling described here 
redefines growth from a sustainability 
perspective. The term ‘growth’ means 
different things to different audiences. 
Businesses and governments focus on 
economic growth, using indicators such as 
GDP. Environmentalists tend to focus on 
the growth of physical throughput in the 
economy, or physical/material growth. 
Such growth implies spreading over more 
physical area, expanding material and 
energy throughput, or increasing the stock 
of physical products, buildings and 
infrastructure. Physical growth is coupled 
to increased environmental pressures and 
resource depletion. 
Based on this understanding of these two 
types of growth, it becomes conceptually 
possible for economic growth (defined as 
money flow) to be decoupled from physical 
growth of the economy (resource consump-
tion) and associated environmental 
pressures. Some economists believe that it 
is possible to reduce the material intensity 
of GDP, so that GDP can grow indefinitely 
in a finite material world. 
Some development economists distinguish 
between development (improvements in 
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well-being plus material economic growth), 
mal-development (material economic 
growth with no improvements in well-
being), underdevelopment (no material 
economic growth and no improvements in 
well-being), and sustainable development 
(improvements in well-being plus non-
material economic growth) (Figure 13). 
This implies that development strategies 
for developing countries could be split into 
two modes (which could be consecutive 
phases in certain circumstances). The first 
mode would entail moving from mal-
development/underdevelopment to 
development whereby improvements in 
well-being for the majority are achieved 
via inclusive material economic growth. 
This is mainstream development 
economics, but it virtually ignores 
ecological sustainability. 
The second development mode would 
entail a shift to sustainable development 
whereby improvements in well-being are 
achieved via non-material economic 
growth. This approach is often considered 
together with the idea of ‘leapfrogging’ 
which usually means either shortening the 
transition from the first to the second 
mode considerably, or skipping the 
development phase altogether. 
Leapfrogging, however, requires 
substantial capacity for sustainability-
oriented innovations and an appropriate set 
of institutional arrangements to provide 
incentives and harness innovations that 
demonstrate economically viable ‘leapfrog’ 
Source: Redrawn from Gallopin, 2003, p. 27
Figure 13. The different guises of development
Increasing quality of life
Increasing
GDP
4 Sustainable 
 development
Decreasing or 
steady GDP
5 Zero growth
1 Unsustainable 
 development
Material 
growth
Reduced/
non material 
growth
Constant or decreasing quality of life
Increasing
GDP
Decreasing or 
steady GDP
3 Under-
 development
2 Mal- 
 development
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Reduced/
non material 
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technologies that will make more 
sustainable development a viable option. 
In conclusion, decoupling can lead to a 
rethinking of assumptions about economic 
growth and, by implication, GDP as the key 
indicator of growth. The GDP indicator 
remains a good measure of economic 
activity. But it needs to be joined by 
indicators of growth that encourage 
decoupling and dematerialization, in order 
to generate a more balanced 
understanding of development. The next 
step would be to find an agreed indicator of 
development that reflects progress made 
in decoupling. 
3.2 Innovation and 
decoupling 
Resource and impact decoupling will 
require radical changes in the global 
metabolism that will depend on innovations 
for more sustainable resource use. 
Knowledge and information are key drivers 
of economic growth, and the returns on 
investments in knowledge often outweigh 
the returns on investments in capital and 
un-/semi-skilled labour. Innovations 
include new knowledge and information 
processing capacities that are built into 
production processes as technologies, 
operating routines or managerial/
organization systems at the firm and/or 
macro-economy level. 
The problem with the national innovation 
systems that have been promoted by many 
governments over the past few decades is 
that they are aimed at promoting economic 
growth with insufficient attention paid to the 
various dimensions of decoupling (cleaner 
production being an obvious exception). In 
other words, innovation is not in and of itself 
a good thing from a sustainable resource 
management perspective. A new concept of 
innovation is required. 
‘Eco-innovation’ is such a new concept. It is 
defined by the OECD as “the creation or 
implementation of new, or significantly 
improved, products (goods and services), 
processes, marketing methods, 
organizational structures and institutional 
arrangements which – with or without 
intent – lead to environmental 
improvements compared to relevant 
alternatives”. Institutional innovations such 
as changes in values, beliefs, knowledge, 
norms, and administrative acts are 
included, along with changes in 
management, organization, laws and 
systems of governance that reduce 
environmental impacts. 
Whereas the first generation of innovation 
investments has focused on labour 
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productivity through the application of 
knowledge embedded in information 
systems, the second generation will need 
to focus on resource productivity. Figure 14 
shows substantial increases in labour 
productivity, with materials and energy 
productivity lagging behind. Prices as the 
key driver of first generation innovations 
are reflected in Figure 15, showing that 
labour costs have gone up steadily, while 
prices of materials and energy remained 
static or even declined (until recently, when 
many material costs increased rapidly).
The key to decoupling in practice will be 
sustainability-oriented innovations that 
make it possible to increase resource 
productivity, thereby reducing metabolic 
rates (assuming that the rebound effect 
remains modest). Increasing resource 
productivity may also justify increasing 
resource prices, thereby benefitting 
resource producers (often in developing 
countries). 
Innovations are continuous learning 
processes that are necessary in a highly 
complex globalized world where fixed bits 
of knowledge rapidly become obsolete. The 
modern economy is better seen as a 
learning economy rather than a knowledge 
economy, underlining the importance of 
innovations in technology, institutions, and 
relationships that manage cooperation, 
Figure 14. Resource Productivity, labour 
productivity and energy productivity in EU-15
Note: Labour productivity in GDP per annual working hours; material 
productivity in GDP per domestic consumption (DMC) and energy 
productivity in GDP per total primary energy supply (TPES).
Source: EEA, 2011
Indexed 
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Figure 15. Price dynamics of wages, materials 
and electricity
Note: All series are in real prices without direct taxes. Wages are based on 
collectively agreed wages (CAO) in the Netherlands (source CBS). Materials 
are from the CRB Commodity Price Index (CCI) reflecting worldwide prices. 
Electricity prices are from CBS and Eurostat. Own calculations in the wages 
series and electricity series in order to standardize different series on each 
other (multiplicative standardization).
Source: De Bruyn et al., 2009
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social cohesion, solidarity, social learning 
and benefit sharing. 
Past innovation concerned with economic 
competitiveness and growth has 
contributed to an extraordinary increase in 
production, consumption and economic 
growth and therefore improvements in 
average human welfare. However, this has 
occurred along an unsustainable trajectory. 
Innovation now needs to be harnessed for 
environmental protection and restoration. 
Merging these seemingly disparate themes 
of sustainability and systems of innovation 
offers an opportunity to develop 
sustainability-oriented innovation systems 
that contribute to decoupling through 
reducing environmental pressure and 
contributing to sustainability during 
economic activities. 
Figure 16 is an idealized image that 
demonstrates the difference between 
incremental innovations and systems 
x
2  
4  
2000 1970  2030 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. System innovation 
a At time of publication
Source: Vollenbroek, 2002
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innovation. Changes at the system level 
offer the most effective way to achieve 
decoupling, even by a factor of 10. 
Development depends on the capacity for 
innovation, and much has been learned 
over the past two decades about the 
dynamics of the innovation process. 
Investments in innovations, however, have 
been motivated primarily by the desire to 
accelerate growth, with little attention paid 
to various dimensions of decoupling 
(although impact decoupling has received 
much more attention than resource 
decoupling). The challenge is to apply the 
insights about innovation to resource 
productivity. Eco-innovations hold the key 
to decoupling as a practical framework for 
action. In this regard, developing countries 
may enjoy a strategic advantage because 
they do not face the same market and 
institutional rigidities imposed by 
technological and physical infrastructures 
that are rapidly becoming obsolete as more 
ecological thresholds are breached. 
3.3 Cities as spaces for 
innovation 
Cities have historically been centres of 
political, economic, cultural and 
informational power. As of 2007, over 50% 
of people lived in cities. As the world’s 
population grows from the current 6.8 
billion people (2010 estimate) to 8 billion by 
2030 and perhaps 9 billion by 2050, cities 
are likely to absorb most of the growing 
population. The bulk of the growth could 
well be in secondary and tertiary cities, 
not the existing sprawling mega-cities like 
Cairo, Calcutta, Shanghai, and San Paulo. 
By 2015, nearly 60% of the total world’s 
people are expected to be living in cities of 
less than a million people. 
People have been attracted to cities by 
globalization, resource efficiency, improved 
infrastructure, economic opportunities, and 
the information and communication 
technology (ICT) revolution. The global 
economy is now organized into networks of 
cities, with computerized coordination and 
logistical systems that provide jobs, 
education, shelter, protection, cultural 
assimilation, and access to information to 
billions of people. Unsurprisingly, growing 
urbanization correlates with rising levels of 
GDP per capita, though 1 in 3 urban 
dwellers still live in slums.
The property development industry as a key 
driver of growth (using cheap credit to fuel 
consumption of imported goods securitized 
against property) helps explain the 40% 
increase in the extraction of industrial and 
construction minerals since 1980. The 
construction industry worldwide is now a de
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$4.2+ trillion global industry, is responsible 
for 10% of global GDP, employs over 100 
million people, and consumes around 50% 
of resources, 45% of global energy (5% 
during construction), 40% of water and 
70% of all timber products. 
Just as countries have metabolic rates, so 
do cities. They may seem to have a lower 
metabolic rate than the countryside, but 
they externalize many energy- and 
materially-intensive services to the 
peripheral areas. As a general rule, as the 
GDP per capita increases, the metabolic 
rate of the city increases. At the same time, 
cities concentrate large numbers of people 
into small places, and they also 
concentrate the knowledge, financial, 
social and institutional resources required 
for sustainability innovations. This captures 
the dilemma of cities for sustainability: 
they drive the global unsustainable use of 
resources, but they are also where the 
greatest potential exists for sustainability 
innovations. 
Judging from current trends, urban 
infrastructure could become a primary 
focus of innovations surrounding energy 
use, mobility and the water cycle (sources, 
uses and re-uses), mediated by a wide 
range of extremely complex ‘socio-
technical’ and ‘socio-ecological’ networks. 
Zero-carbon sustainable cities are being 
planned, for example in Dongtan near 
Shanghai, Masdar in Abu Dhabi, Treasure 
Island in San Francisco Bay and Songdo in 
South Korea. While these are capital-
intensive and have yet to meet their goals, 
they may be pioneers for future decoupling. 
A worldwide movement of urban leaders 
is seeking ways for cities to reduce their 
metabolic rates. The International Council 
for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) 
is the most significant global network 
promoting sustainable cities. It now 
includes 1000 cities and presents a global 
case for decoupling urban infrastructure 
to reduce dependence on resources 
located beyond the boundaries of the 
metropolitan areas. This may include a 
radical shift to public transportation for 
people and goods, reduced dependence on 
fossil fuels, increased dependence on 
locally grown food and localized supply of 
(recycled) water, much higher densities 
and the end of sprawl, integrated living 
and working neighbourhoods, zero waste 
systems, cleaner production, and 
responsible ecologically sustainable 
consumption (driven in part by the way big 
supermarkets are embracing the organic 
food revolution and by the growing 
popularity of fair trade brands).
In conclusion, innovations for more 
sustainable use of resources are already 
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underway in the world’s cities. The concept 
of decoupling can become an operational 
tool that will help cities to determine their 
metabolic rates and the potential for 
reducing these rates over time. 
3.4 Lessons from the 
country case studies 
This section draws lessons from case 
studies on China, Germany, Japan and 
South Africa. The selection of cases was 
based on their approaches to decoupling 
and was not intended to be representative 
of the diverse global contexts, lacking, for 
example, a study of a large low-density 
developed economy (e.g. USA or Australia) 
or a large low-density developing economy 
(such as Brazil). Nevertheless, the four 
case studies demonstrate emerging 
responses to resource depletion and 
environmental impacts at the country level. 
Although none of the countries have 
fully-fledged integrated policy frameworks 
for achieving comprehensive resource and 
impact decoupling, significant empirical 
trends and the key elements for compre-
hensive policies that could result in more 
sustainable use of resources are in many 
ways already in place across these very 
diverse contexts. 
The case studies indicate that the rising 
economic and environmental costs of 
resource depletion have affected the 
economic growth and development 
trajectories of these countries, leading to 
various forms of resource and impact 
decoupling. The language of resource 
efficiency, resource productivity, 
dematerialization, and material flows has 
clearly entered mainstream policy 
language in these countries, and most 
likely many others, in ways that reflect a 
very diverse understanding of what 
decoupling means in practice. 
In broad terms, policymaking with respect 
to resource use and environmental impacts 
over the past four decades has gradually 
shifted from a ‘command-and-control’ 
focus on negative environmental impacts 
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(especially pollution) to responses to 
resource depletion that use economic 
instruments. This has taken place against 
a background of rapid global growth as 
economic globalization facilitated the 
relocation of key manufacturing sectors 
from developed to developing countries. 
The resulting increase in material flows 
from 40 to 59 billion tons (40–59 Gt) per 
annum over the two decades starting in 
1980 explains in part why resource 
depletion issues have become a concern of 
policymakers at national government level. 
The German National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development (NSSD) 
comprises strategic, mostly quantitative, 
trend objectives and a set of 21 indicators 
grouped under different headings. Indicator 
1 (‘resource conservation’) includes sub-
indicators 1a (‘energy productivity’) and 1b 
(‘resource productivity’). The NSSD goal is 
to double both energy productivity (base 
year 1990) and resource productivity (base 
year 1994) by 2020. These goals are the 
cornerstone of the government’s position 
on resource use. 
South Africa’s key macro-economic policy 
frameworks do not recognize resource 
constraints as an economic factor, 
although the South African scientific 
community considers resource depletion 
as an urgent priority for water and soil, 
while decoupling is needed with respect to 
energy and a wide range of environmental 
impacts. The 2008 National Framework for 
Sustainable Development (NFSD) proposed 
five strategies: enhancing systems for 
integrated planning and implementation; 
sustaining ecosystems and using resources 
sustainably; investing in sustainable 
economic development and infrastructure; 
creating sustainable human settlements; 
and responding appropriately to emerging 
human development, economic and 
environmental challenges. The NFSD 
referred specifically to the need for 
‘dematerialization’ which was defined in 
terms of decoupling.
Since the adoption of its Scientific Outlook 
of Development in 2003, the Chinese 
government has fundamentally altered its 
development philosophy, leading to the 
objective of building an ‘ecological 
civilization’. This approach made resource 
and environmental concerns top policy 
priorities. The 11th Five-Year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development (2006–
2010) marked a key turning point for the 
process of reconciling rapid 
industrialization with the ambition to build 
an ecological civilization. The plan sets 22 
quantitative indicators of which eight are 
mandatory targets, five of them related to 
environment and resources. China is, in 
many ways, the test case for the global 
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economy. Because of China’s dominant 
economic position, and because it wants to 
continue its rapid economic growth but use 
resources more sustainably, the measures 
that China introduces to reconcile these 
objectives will be of crucial significance for 
every other developing country with similar 
policy intentions. 
In 2007 the Japanese government adopted a 
policy that committed Japan to becoming a 
‘Sustainable Society’, which it proposes to 
build through comprehensive measures 
integrating the three aspects of such a 
society, specifically, a Low Carbon Society, a 
Sound Material-Cycle Society and a Society 
in Harmony with Nature. This decision both 
consolidates a long period of sectoral policy 
development and sets the stage for 
integrated planning in the future. Material 
Flow Accounts (MFA) have become an 
integral feature of Japanese environmental 
policy, identifying the whole system of 
material flows in the national economy and 
providing itemized overviews for such flows. 
As can be seen from this brief review, 
decoupling economic growth from negative 
environmental impacts and promoting 
resource productivity have found a place on 
the policy agenda of all four countries. They 
have adopted policies that call for the 
integration of economic and sustainable 
development policies. Although decoupling 
will be much more challenging to achieve 
in practice, the fact that consensus has 
been reached on what is needed is of great 
significance. 
Although decoupling as defined in this 
report is a long-term process of macro-
structural transformation to build 
sustainable socio-ecological systems, the 
trends at country level that emerge from 
the case studies confirm that relative 
decoupling with respect to resource use is 
already underway in developed economies. 
Resource-use reductions will be much 
more difficult but are, ultimately, what 
really is needed most. However, the key 
factor that will determine whether this 
happens will be the level of investment in 
innovations for more sustainable use of 
resources. This will be the focus of the 
second Decoupling Report from the IRP.
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G
lobal trade of the resources 
being assessed here is a 
complicated process, with 
different influences at the various 
stages of the life cycle (Figure 3), from 
initial extraction of a resource to the 
ultimate disposal of the commodity 
produced from the resource (though many 
products contain large numbers of 
material resources, each of which may 
have come from a different part of the 
globe). Different actors, often from distant 
countries, may play a key role at the 
various stages, making it challenging to 
determine where responsibility for 
decoupling should be assigned. Further 
complicating the challenge, different 
policies may be required at different 
stages of the life cycle. Ideally, every stage 
of the life cycle should be accompanied by 
appropriate policies promoting 
decoupling, though this ideal remains far 
from reality. 
The geographic distribution of resource 
extraction seldom corresponds to the 
geographic distribution of manufacturing 
processes and consumption, and to the 
environmental impacts coupled to these 
parts of the life cycle. The largest material 
flows occur at the point of extraction, and 
there they add most to the indicator of 
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dynamics
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resource use. Once the raw materials have 
been extracted and become subject to 
trading, they have already left some of their 
original volume behind as wastes and 
emissions. Generally speaking, in the chain 
from extraction to manufacture to sale for 
consumption, each commodity gains 
economic value as it has embodied ever 
more labour and intellectual capital over 
the value chain, but at the same time loses 
physical weight as it travels. This creates a 
major problem for objective international 
comparisons of resource productivity and 
decoupling, because international trade 
shifts costs and benefits in ways that often 
are difficult to unravel. 
Over the past few decades, international 
trade has increased dramatically. Between 
1970 and 2006, worldwide trade volumes in 
monetary units (real terms) grew by an 
average of 7.2% annually. Compared with 
1970, in 2006 the value of trade was almost 
a factor of 10 higher for manufactured 
products, 2.3 times higher for fuels and 
mining products, and more than three 
times higher for agricultural products. The 
latter two are material resources being 
assessed in this report, while the first 
contains variable amounts of these 
resources; this makes it impossible to 
present an analysis of only the primary raw 
materials being assessed here. However, 
the perspectives provided on total 
international trade can be considered to be 
at least indicative of trade in raw materials.
Growing trade in monetary terms is 
reflected in an increase in physical trade 
flows, albeit somewhat dampened. In 1970, 
around 5.4 billion tons (5.4 Gt) were 
internationally traded, increasing to 
19 billion tons (19 Gt) in 2005. A relative 
decoupling between monetary and physical 
trade flows has occurred because trade in 
manufactured products with a higher price 
per ton has grown faster than trade in raw 
materials; in 2005, manufactured products 
made up only about a quarter of physical 
trade, but contributed almost three 
quarters of the economic value. 
Intensifying global trade also implies 
growing environmental pressures 
associated with trade activities. On the one 
hand, these include direct pressures, in 
particular due to the impacts of 
transportation. On the other hand, the 
indirect (or embodied) environmental 
pressures are augmented with growing 
trade volumes. According to recent model 
calculations, CO2 emissions embodied in 
internationally traded products accounted 
for 27% of the total energy-related CO2 
emissions in 2005, up from 22% in 1995. 
For the issue of water consumption, 
measured by the ‘water footprint’ indicator 
(a measure of the direct and indirect use of de
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water to produce a good), total water 
embodied in global trade was around 16% 
of the global water footprint in the 1997 to 
2001 period. Material extraction embodied 
in global trade was estimated to be about 
20% of total worldwide material extraction 
in the year 2000. 
International trade thus contributes a 
significant share of total environmental 
pressures. Therefore, different results are 
obtained when resource use and 
environmental pressures are accounted for 
from a production perspective (i.e. 
allocation to the country where the 
resource is extracted) versus from a 
consumption perspective (i.e. allocation to 
the country where a product is finally 
consumed). Production-based systems are 
far more common, particularly because 
they use clear system boundaries. 
However, complementary consumption-
based accounting systems along the life 
cycle of a product are required to take 
trade-related effects into account. This 
more comprehensive system of accounts 
could serve as the empirical basis for 
developing options for sharing 
environmental responsibility among 
countries that are playing different roles 
along the entire value chain. 
Half of the volume of world trade is shared 
between the EU-27 (excluding intra-EU 
trade), China, the USA, and Japan, with 
about 45% of world exports and 51% of 
world imports. At the other end of the 
spectrum, 49 of the least developed 
countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa 
and Central Asia, together hold a share of 
only 1.1% of global trade. While some 
developing and emerging countries (most 
notably China, but also Brazil, Mexico, 
Malaysia, India and many others) have 
achieved successful integration into the 
global trade system, globalization has not 
benefitted all countries and individuals. 
Industrialized countries (here including 
China) largely export manufactured 
products. Many developing regions, on the 
other hand, continue to rely strongly on the 
export of raw materials. Latin America 
Figure 16. Composition of exports (in monetary 
units) by world regions, 2006
Source: WTO, 2008
● Agricultural products
● Minerals and fuels
● Manufacturers
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earns almost 70% of export revenues from 
agricultural and mineral raw materials, 
more than three quarters of total exports of 
the Middle East are fossil fuels, and Africa 
has the highest share in primary products 
(80% of exports, consisting of agricultural 
products, minerals and fossil fuels) 
(Figure 16). However, this general pattern 
has some important deviations, as some 
industrial countries, typically those with a 
low population density, such as Australia, 
Canada, and the USA, also play a major 
role as exporters of primary products. 
The total extraction of material resources 
is as unevenly distributed across the world 
as might be expected (Figure 17). Biomass 
extraction is distributed most evenly (in 
close relation to population numbers), and 
the extraction of fossil fuels is distributed 
most unevenly, depending on resource 
endowment and previous exploitation. 
International trade redistributes these 
resources across the globe, allowing some 
countries to export resources and other 
countries to be supplied with primary 
products for manufacture and consumption 
(both domestic and abroad).
As Figure 17 illustrates, industrialized 
countries have the highest share in trade 
activities, while their share of materials 
extraction corresponds roughly to their 
share of world population. Even if they are 
also active exporters, they import two 
thirds of all traded materials. This 
difference is also reflected when 
comparing economic (monetary) and 
physical trade balances (Figure 18).
While monetary trade balances tend to be 
relatively even (except for the growing trade 
deficit of the USA), physical trade balances 
have a systematic asymmetry; industrial 
countries tend to be net material 
importers, while developing countries have 
served as net exporters over the whole 
time period. During the last decade, the 
group of countries with economies in 
transition have also become net exporters. 
In 2005, the industrial countries net 
imported around 2 billion tons (2 Gt), of 
Source: Drawn from SEC database, http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/socec/
inhalt/3812.htm, see Steinberger et al., 2010
Figure 17. Raw material extraction and trade by 
country type
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● Imports
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which two thirds originated from 
developing countries and one third from 
the former Comecon countries.
Current economic specialization and 
resulting physical trade patterns have had 
both positive and negative implications for 
economic development in developing 
countries, with the balance depending 
largely on the enabling and regulatory 
conditions and the specific conditions that 
are agreed. Factors cited for contributing to 
the negative impacts have included low 
prices for raw materials, limited domestic 
processing, rent-seeking, and many other 
factors. 
Despite these concerns, international trade 
can make an important contribution to 
global decoupling when guided by 
appropriate policies on environment and 
trade. These have hitherto been managed 
separately at country and global levels 
(with, for example, very limited connections 
between the work of the WTO and global 
environmental bodies such as the 
international environmental conventions 
and UNEP’s Governing Council). Improved 
policies to support decoupling include 
reducing global resource use through 
exploiting transport and physical or 
geological potentials in a way that 
minimizes negative environmental impacts; 
incorporating in trade negotiations the full 
Million tons 
Physical trade balances
Monetary trade balances
a Note that net imports and net exports do not balance out, as many 
developing countries do not fully report their international trade to the 
UN, which provides the basic data for these calculations (UN Comtrade 
data base).
Source: Dittrich, 2010
Billion US$ 
Figure 18. Physical and monetary trade balances 
of three country types, 1962 to 2005a
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value chain of the commodities being 
traded; and agreeing on prices that 
incorporate environmental factors and 
social costs that are now considered 
‘externalities’.
Such measures would support the desire 
of developing countries to diversify their 
economies so that they can reduce 
dependence on the export of a small 
number of commodities, support the 
development of domestic markets, and 
promote sustainable economic 
development. 
Some decoupling has accompanied the 
expansion of material consumption, as the 
overall material intensity of the global 
economy declined from 2.1 tons in 1980 to 
1.6 tons per US$1000 in 2002 (Figure 19). In 
other words, 25% less material input was 
required in 2002 compared to 1980 to 
produce one unit of real GDP. This 
decoupling was an economic response to 
the innovations made possible by the 
growth of information and communications 
technology, new materials, more efficient 
production methods, better health and 
education, and a host of other factors. It 
seems reasonable to conclude that 
resource decoupling on a global scale has 
been a significant part of global GDP 
growth, with many developing countries 
showing more rapid GDP growth than the 
industrialized countries, at least some of 
which experienced low, or even negative, 
GDP growth rates in some years. However, 
Figure 19 also shows that Western Europe 
and North America remained the most 
efficient economies due to their knowledge 
infrastructures and technological 
capabilities, and the overall process of 
relocating extractive industries in other 
parts of the world. In contrast, the 
resource-rich resource exporting countries 
in Latin America, Africa, Oceania (due 
mainly to Australia’s rapid rise as a coal 
and iron ore producer) and Asia were either 
Figure 19. Material intensity of the world 
economy: Domestic extraction of materials per 
unit of GDP by world region
Source: Behrens et al., 2007
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highly inefficient (Africa) or were building 
fast-growing economies that were 
increasingly dependent on construction 
minerals, ores and fossil fuels (Asia and 
Oceania). 
Is decoupling a realistic basis for further 
policy work to support the green economy? 
Will the solutions to the global economic 
recession depend on investments in ‘green 
growth’ rather than just be a return to 
business as usual? No definitive answers 
are available, but some evidence suggests 
cautiously positive answers. For example, 
the $2–$3 trillion that will be invested to 
revive the global economy has been 
inspired by more than a narrow economic 
recovery vision, as some countries have 
incorporated ‘green growth’ elements into 
their economic rescue packages 
(Figure 20). These include expanding public 
transport and freight rail services, 
constructing ‘smart’ electrical grid 
management systems, investing in 
renewable energy (wind, solar, bio-energy), 
greening of living spaces, restoring rivers 
and forests, and recycling wastes. Many of 
these investments are concentrated in new 
kinds of urban infrastructure, thus 
reinforcing the significance of cities in 
managing the transition to ‘green 
economies’.
Figure 20. Eco-friendly spending, total amount and percentage of total fiscal stimulus package
Source: HSBC, 2009
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T
his Assessment Report has 
provided evidence that it is time to 
recognize the limits to the natural 
resources available to support 
future resource demands created by 
traditional approaches to economic growth 
and human development. Growing 
resource constraints will not affect 
everyone equally. The world’s poorest 
people will be deprived of opportunities to 
develop, even though they are minor 
consumers of most materials covered in 
this report. At the same time, the world’s 
richest nations will find it increasingly 
difficult to enjoy their current levels of 
consumption and the fruits of a stable 
world if resource depletion continues and 
resource prices increase. The optimal 
solution for all countries is to make 
sustainable resource management a 
central focus of policies for growth and 
development. As a contribution to what this 
means in practice, this report has shown 
how decoupling of resource consumption 
and environmental impacts from economic 
activities can provide a policy tool for 
calibrating the shifts required over time to 
manage the transition to a more 
sustainable global economy.
The report has distinguished between 
resource and impact decoupling, and 
5. Major policy challenges© E
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between decoupling and absolute resource 
use reductions. Relative resource 
decoupling is happening on a global scale, 
but is more pronounced in the developed 
economies that are already consuming 
relatively large amounts of resources. Little 
contemporary evidence of impact 
decoupling is available, the historical 
achievements of environmental policies 
notwithstanding. To make the transition to 
a more sustainable global economy, 
sustainable resource management 
strategies will be required that promote 
resource and impact decoupling, with an 
emphasis on absolute resource use 
reductions in developed economies and 
relative decoupling in developing 
economies (up to a certain point after 
which they must also shift into an absolute 
reduction mode). 
Some of the major challenges of decoupling 
that remain to be addressed include:
• How can global resource flows and their 
associated environmental impacts be 
integrated with efforts to deal with 
problems such as climate change, 
degradation of ecosystem services, and 
pollution?
• How can policymakers (and the public) 
be convinced of the reality of physical 
limits to the quantity of natural 
resources available for human use and 
that the negative environmental impacts 
of economic activities also have limits?
• What are the economic factors driving 
the decoupling that is already taking 
place, and how can these be mobilized 
more effectively to enhance escalations 
in investments in innovations and 
technologies that can accelerate 
decoupling?
• How can market signals generate 
increases in innovation for resource 
productivity? How can international trade 
best incorporate the concepts of 
resource decoupling to support equitable 
conditions of trade in natural resources? 
• How can the current economic growth 
model be modified to realize the aims of 
‘non-material growth’ through 
sustainable resource management?
• Given that the multiple challenges of 
economic growth, sustainable resource 
management and ending poverty take 
place in the midst of the ‘second wave of 
urbanization’, how can cities become the 
spaces where ingenuity, resources and 
communities come together to generate 
in practice what decoupling means in the 
way cities produce and consume? 
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• How can decoupling be demonstrated 
as a necessary precondition for reducing 
the levels of global inequality and 
eventually eradicating poverty? In 
particular, how can developing countries 
find a growth and development strategy 
that eradicates poverty by increasing 
resource productivity and restoring 
ecosystem services? 
The IRP intends to seek answers to such 
questions in its future work.
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T
his Assessment Report has shown 
that both resource and impact 
decoupling are taking place, albeit 
at a modest pace. This might be 
taken to imply that any innovation that 
results in less inputs or impacts per unit of 
output will contribute to decoupling. 
However, the ‘rebound effect’, in which 
savings from efficiency are used to exploit 
other resources, suggests some caution is 
required. The size of rebound effects 
depends at least partly on the trajectory of 
prices. In a context of constant or sinking 
price levels, rebound effects tend to become 
larger. Figure 7 showed that the long-term 
historical trajectory of real resource prices 
has been downward in the 20th century, with 
some periods of soaring resource prices. 
Since the turn of the millennium, many have 
argued that now, finally, resource prices will 
continuously rise. The surge of oil, gas and 
other mineral resource prices until the 
economic crisis in 2008 was triggered by 
steeply rising demand from the rapidly 
developing Asian economies, following 
standard economic theory of supply and 
demand. But the economic interpretation 
that declining price levels are a correct 
market indicator for resources not 
becoming more scarce is risky: the opposite 
may transpire when it is already too late to 
take corrective measures. 
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But Figures 1 and 4 demonstrated that 
during the 20th century, GDP grew 
substantially faster than material 
extraction in the four categories of 
resources considered here. The 
’dematerialization’ of the world economy 
has happened more or less spontaneously, 
effectively raising resource productivity by 
about 1–2% annually on the global level. 
This decoupling has been particularly 
apparent among the industrial countries, 
suggesting that considerable additional 
room for decoupling remains. 
UNEP’s International Resource Panel will 
be addressing the challenges of applying 
the concept of decoupling more 
comprehensively in separate reports, 
including applications to water, land and 
soil, and other key natural resources.
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CCS Carbon capture and storage
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
DE Domestic Extraction
DMC Domestic Material Consumption
ECLAC UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EU-27 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom
GDP Gross Domestic Product
Gt Gigatons 
ICLEI International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
IRP International Resource Panel
LCA Life cycle assessment
MFA Material flow accounting
MTB Monetary trade balance
NFSD National Framework for Sustainable Development
NSSD National Strategy for Sustainable Development
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PTB Physical trade balance 
TPES Total Primary Energy Supply
UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
USA United States of America
WTO World Trade Organization
Abbreviations
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Humankind has witnessed phenomenal economic and social development in the past century. However, there 
are increasing signs that it has come at a cost to the environment and to the availability of cheap resources. 
Despite progress, there is still great disparity between the rich and the poor.
 
The dilemma of expanding economic activities equitably while attempting to stabilize the rate of resource 
use and reduce environmental impacts poses an unprecedented opportunity and challenge to society. In this 
report, the International Resource Panel has sought to apply the concept of decoupling economic growth and 
human well-being from environmental impacts and resource use to address this challenge.
 
The report provides a solid foundation for the concept of decoupling, clearly defining key terms and providing 
empirical evidence of escalating resource use. It shows that decoupling is already taking place to some 
extent, but is lagging far behind its potential. The scenarios show that we are facing a historic choice about 
how we use resources and the report scopes the potential of innovation, rethinking economic growth and the 
role of cities in building more resource efficient economies. Four case studies at the country level show how 
policy makers are implementing decoupling strategies.
 
This report focuses on material resources, namely fossil fuels, minerals, metals and biomass and will be 
complemented by parallel reports of the IRP on land and soil, water, metals, cities and technologies to 
mitigate GHG emissions. These future reports will contribute to the International Resource Panel’s objective 
to build a better understanding of how to decouple environmental impacts from economic growth and 
improved human well-being.
 
It is hoped that policy makers aiming to green their economies will greatly benefit from the contributions 
that the International Resource Panel is making through its work on decoupling resource consumption from 
economic growth.
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